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THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20505

National Intelligence Council

DDI #7226-82 7 September 1982

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MEMORANDUM FOR:	Director of Central Intelligence	
FROM:	Maurice C. Ernst National Intelligence Officer for Economics	
SUBJECT:	Background Papers for PEPAB	
recommend good job showing greatly increase confidence. Whe traditional debt amount of debt of	ad is some material for you on the international financial may want to read before the PEPAB meeting. I particularly article on the LDC cash flow crisis, which does a how the big recent increase in LDC short-term debt has ded their vulnerability to a weakening of bankers' en confidence flags, the relevant consideration is not the service ratio on long-term debt, but rather the total coming due, plus interest.	25X1
bit too sanguing Moreover, it doe with the big in	Wriston's piece on international lending appears to me a e. It largely ignores the entire issue of systemic risk. es not consider the short-term debt problem, which, together crease in interest rates, is the main source of LDC the past two years.	
drafting our own paper, but has little in shape to show you at this time. I have attached some hypothetical		25X1
chaired by Treas	inancial panic prepared for the interagency study sury that is also under way. These are admittedly extreme, in particular debt repudiation by Argentina, or as part of wers' revolt, are within the realm of possibility.	25X1
		25X1
	Maurice C. Ernst	

Attachments, As stated

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DCI:NIO/Econ

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